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Abstract—We propose a random coefficients nested logit (RCNL) model
to compare the tractable nested logit (NL) model with the more complex
random coefficients logit (RC) model. After a simulation study, we use
data on the European automobile market. Both the NL and RC models are
rejected against the RCNL model. The RC model results in different sub-
stitution patterns and a wider market definition than the NL and RCNL
models. Nevertheless, the predicted price effects from mergers are robust
across models. Our findings stress the importance of accounting for dis-
crete sources of market segmentation not captured by continuous product
characteristics.
I. Introduction
DISCRETE choice models of product differentiationhave gained considerable importance in empirical work.
Because they treat products as bundles of characteristics, they
offer the possibility of uncovering rich substitution patterns
with a limited number of parameters. Berry (1994) developed
a framework to estimate a class of discrete choice models with
unobserved consumer heterogeneity based on aggregate sales
data. His framework includes the random coefficient logit
model of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995, hereafter BLP),
the nested logit model (with special random coefficients on
discrete product characteristics), and the logit model (without
consumer heterogeneity).
The logit and nested logit models have been popular
because of their computational simplicity, since they can be
transformed to simple linear regressions of market shares
on product characteristics. At the same time, they have long
been criticized because they yield substitution patterns that
are too restrictive. The logit model assumes that consumer
preferences are uncorrelated across all products, implying
symmetric cross-price elasticities. The nested logit model
allows preferences to be correlated across products within
the same group or “nest.” It thus entails a special kind of ran-
dom coefficients on group dummy variables (Cardell, 1997).
It allows products of the same group to be closer substitutes
than products of different groups, but the aggregate substitu-
tion patterns remain restrictive: cross-price elasticities within
the same group are still symmetric, and substitution out-
side a group is symmetric to all other groups. In contrast,
BLP’s random coefficients logit model incorporates random
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coefficients for continuously measured product characteris-
tics (and at the same time still allows random coefficients on
group dummy variables with other distributional assumptions
than those of the nested logit model). This creates potentially
more flexible substitution patterns, where products tend to
be closer substitutes as they have more similar continuous
characteristics. However, the random coefficients model is
computationally more demanding, and several recent papers
have studied a variety of problems relating to its numerical
performance (see Knittel & Metaxoglou, forthcoming; Dubé,
Fox, & Su, 2012; Judd & Skrainka, 2011).
Against this background, a particularly timely issue is
to assess whether and when the popular logit and nested
logit models can be used as reasonable alternatives to the
computationally more demanding random coefficients logit
model. In this paper we provide a systematic comparison of
these demand models, and as an illustration, we assess how
they perform in competition policy analysis. To accomplish
this, we start from a random coefficients nested logit model
(RCNL), which combines the random coefficients logit (RC)
and nested logit (NL) models. The random coefficients on the
continuous characteristics can take any distributional form,
as in the general RC framework. In contrast, the random
coefficients for the discrete characteristics take the special
distributional assumptions of the NL model. This simplifies
the computational burden and enables us to assess the relative
importance of both sources of consumer heterogeneity.1
To motivate our empirical analysis, we begin with two
groups of Monte Carlo experiments. First, we consider an RC
model with a normally distributed random coefficient for a
group dummy variable. For a wide variety of designs, we find
that the true RC model and a misspecified NL model result in
similar estimated own- and cross-price elasticities. Hence, the
specific distributional assumptions of the RC and NL mod-
els regarding the valuation for the group dummy variable do
not matter much in this simple setup.2 Second, we consider
RCNL models with both a normally distributed random coef-
ficient for a continuous characteristic and a nesting parameter
for a group dummy variable. For the wide range of consid-
ered designs, we find that both the RC and the NLs model are
reasonable approximations, with stronger substitution within
1 As shown by McFadden and Train (2000), any discrete choice model
can be approximated by an RC model. This of course also applies to
our setting. For example, it is possible to include random coefficients for
the group dummy variables directly in an RC model (with other distribu-
tional assumptions than those of the nested logit). This would, however, be
computationally very costly when there are many group dummy variables.
2 This is also confirmed by a reverse set of Monte Carlo where the true data-
generating process is that of an NL model and the RC is the misspecified
model.
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than between groups. The RC model provides a better approx-
imation of the own-price elasticities than the NL model, while
both models tend to underestimate the cross-price elasticities
within a group.
These findings are confirmed in our main empirical analy-
sis. We collected a unique data set on the automobile market
for nine European countries covering around 90% of the car
sales in the European Union from 1998 to 2006. The mar-
ket is commonly classified in various segments (subcompact,
compact, intermediate, standard, luxury, SUV, and sports),
and car manufacturers typically promote their models as
belonging to one of these segments. Hence, the segments
may proxy for observed product characteristics such as size,
engine performance, and fuel efficiency. But it is also possi-
ble that they capture intrinsically unobserved features shared
by different car models. Our data set is therefore particu-
larly interesting to compare the performance of the logit, NL,
RC, and RCNL models. Consistent with earlier findings, the
logit model is rejected against both the NL and RC models.
More important, in the RCNL model, the nesting parameters
become quantitatively smaller (consistent with the results of
our Monte Carlo experiment), but they remain highly signif-
icant and economically important. Furthermore, the random
coefficients relating to car size become insignificant, while
the random coefficients relating to engine power and fuel
efficiency remain significant. These various findings suggest
that the nesting parameters may proxy for random coeffi-
cients of some of the observed continuous characteristics
but also capture other unobserved dimensions of consumer
preferences.
To illustrate the implications of our findings, we present
own- and cross-price elasticities for the different models, and
we perform policy counterfactuals common in competition
policy: market definition and merger simulation. In terms
of substitution patterns, the results are consistent with our
Monte Carlo analysis: the RC model better approximates the
own-price elasticities than the NL model, and both models
somewhat underestimate the cross-price elasticities within
segments (but less so for the NL model). Despite the differ-
ent substitution patterns, merger simulations of two domestic
mergers yield robust conclusions across different demand
models: while the simple logit clearly appears inappropriate,
the NL, RC, and RCNL all tend to give robust conclusions. In
contrast, the conclusions for market definition are less robust:
the RC suggests a wider market definition than the NL and
RCNL models. This is true whether we start from “segments”
or from “ten nearest substitutes” as the candidate relevant
markets. We draw two implications for competition policy.
First, in market definition, it is important to include sufficient
sources of market segmentation in the demand model. Sec-
ond, the robustness in merger simulation suggests that the
simple NL model can be sufficient to obtain reliable policy
conclusions, despite the different substitution patterns from
the RC model.
More generally, one can draw two implications for the
choice of demand model in applied work. First, the choice
between the tractable NL model and the computationally
more complex RC model may depend on the application.
In our analysis of hypothetical domestic mergers, consumer
heterogeneity regarding the cars’ domestic or foreign origin
is particularly relevant, and the NL model captures this rea-
sonably well. In other applications, the most relevant aspects
of consumer heterogeneity may not be captured well by nest-
ing parameters for groups or subgroups. In these cases, it is
appropriate to estimate RC models with random coefficients
for the most relevant continuous characteristics.
Second, our results imply that it can be important to
account for sources of market segmentation that are not
captured by continuously measured product characteristics.
Adding a nested logit structure to BLP’s random coefficients
model is a tractable way to accomplish this, since it gives
closed-form expressions for integrals in the choice proba-
bilities.3 In principle, BLP’s framework can of course also
incorporate random coefficients on group dummies (and in
a more flexible way). But this is more complicated because
it increases the dimensionality of the integrals that need to
be simulated, and in practice it often proves difficult to esti-
mate the coefficients as precisely as in the closed-form GEV
models. For example, Nevo (2001) estimates a rich demand
model for the U.S. cereals market. His model includes three
random coefficients for the segments (all-family, kids, and
adult), but two of these are estimated rather imprecisely.
Our comparison of alternative discrete choice models is
timely for several related reasons. First, a few recent papers
have thoroughly studied several (often commonly known)
numerical difficulties with the aggregate random coefficients
model: the role of starting values and different optimization
methods (Knittel & Metaxoglou, forthcoming), the accuracy
of BLP’s contraction mapping to invert the market share sys-
tem (Dubé et al., 2012), and alternative methods of integration
of the market share system (Judd & Skrainka, 2011). We
draw from these findings in our own empirical analysis by
cautiously considering multiple starting values, using a tight
inner loop contraction mapping, and carefully approximating
the market share integrals.4
Second, there is a large and rapidly growing empirical liter-
ature estimating aggregate discrete choice models of product
differentiation, with applications in industrial organization,
international trade, environmental and public economics,
marketing, finance, and other areas. A complete review of
the applied aggregate discrete choice literature is beyond the
3 Instead of the nested logit structure, one may also consider other tractable
models from McFadden’s (1978) generalized extreme value model (GEV).
Examples are Small’s (1987) model of ordered alternatives, Bresnahan,
Stern, and Trajtenberg’s (1997) principles of differentiation model, and
most recent, the flexible coefficient multinomial logit model of Davis and
Schiraldi (2012).
4 To invert the market share system, we do not consider Dubé et al.’s
(2012) alternative MPEC approach because we have a large number of
products and markets, implying a large number of nonlinear constraints in
their constrained optimization algorithm. To approximate the market share
integrals, we follow Judd and Skrainka (2011) in our Monte Carlo with
low-dimensional integrals and use a large number of Halton draws in our
empirical analysis with high-dimensional integrals.
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scope of this introduction, so we limit attention here to early
work. Much of this work has actually also looked at automo-
biles. Bresnahan (1981) and Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995)
are important contributions preceding the seminal work of
Berry (1994) and BLP. Verboven (1996) and Fershtman and
Gandal (1998) are early applications of Berry’s (1994) aggre-
gate nested logit model. Nevo (2001), Petrin (2002), and
Sudhir (2001) are early applications with interesting exten-
sions of BLP’s full random coefficients model. In recent
years, academic work appears to focus more exclusively on
the random coefficients models, whereas competition policy
practitioners often use the logit and nested logit models. Our
findings on the automobile market suggest that the nested
logit model may be a reasonable approximation not only
in competition policy but also in other applications where
the market segments are the most relevant differentiating
dimensions, for example, an analysis of trade liberalization.
In contrast, applications on, for example, quality discrimina-
tion or environmental policy would warrant estimating BLP’s
random coefficients logit model, since the relevant random
coefficients (engine power and fuel efficiency) are not well
captured by the nesting parameters.5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the model and conducts Monte Carlo experiments.
Section III uses the data set for the European car market
to estimate the logit, NL, RC, and RCNL models and the
implied price elasticities. Section IV draws implications for
competition policy analysis, applying market definition and
merger simulation. Conclusions follow in section V.
II. The Model
A. Demand
We consider an RCNL that contains the logit, NL, and RC
as special cases. As we discuss, the RCNL model can itself
be seen as a random coefficients model, with special distri-
butional assumptions for the heterogeneity on the discrete
product characteristics.
There are T markets, t = 1, . . . , T . In each market t,
there are Lt potential consumers. Each consumer i may either
choose the outside good 0 or one of the J differentiated prod-
ucts, j = 0, . . . , J . Consumer i’s conditional indirect utility
for the outside good is ui0t = εi0t . For products j = 1, . . . , J ,
it is
uijt = xjtβi + ξjt + εijt , (1)
5 Wojcik (2000) also compares the NL and RC models. She claims the
NL model is likely to be superior, but Berry and Pakes (2001) raise serious
methdological problems with her comparison. Our approach is rather differ-
ent from Wojcik’s since we start from an RCNL model that enables a better
comparison of the NL and RC models. Furthermore, we follow prediction
excercises in the spirit of those advocated by Berry and Pakes by focusing
on comparing price elasticities and other counterfactuals. Our conclusions
are much more nuanced since we focus on identifying circumstances where
the NL may, or may not, be a reasonable alternative.
where xjt is a 1 × K vector of observed product charac-
teristics (including price), βi is a K × 1 vector of random
coefficients capturing the individual-specific valuations for
the product characteristics, ξjt refers to unobserved product
characteristics (to the econometrician), and εijt is a remaining
individual-specific valuation for product j.
Assume that the distributions of the individual valuations
βi and εijt are mutually independent. The random coefficients
vector, βi, can be specified as follows. Let β be a K × 1
vector of mean valuations of the characteristics, σ be a K × 1
vector with standard deviations of the valuations, and νi be
a K × 1 vector with standard normal random variables. We
then specify
βi = β+Σνi, (2)
where Σ is a K × K diagonal matrix with the standard
deviations σ on the diagonal.6
The individual valuations for the products j, εijt follow the
distributional assumptions of the NL model, which allows
valuations to be correlated across products in the same group.
More specifically, suppose each product j can be assigned
to one of G collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive
groups, g = 0, . . . , G, where group 0 is reserved for the
outside good 0. Write
εijt = ζigt + (1 − ρ)εijt , (3)
where εijt is i.i.d extreme value and ζigt has the (unique) distri-
bution such that εijt is extreme value. The nesting parameter
ρ, with 0 ≤ ρ < 1, proxies for the degree of preference
correlation between products of the same group. As ρ goes
to 1, the within-group correlation of utilities goes to 1, and
consumers perceive products of the same group as perfect
substitutes. As ρ goes to 0, the within-group correlation goes
to 0, and the model reduces to the simple logit.
Following Berry’s (1994) discussion of Cardell (1997),
the ζigt can be interpreted as random coefficients on group-
specific dummy variables. More specifically, let djgt be a
group dummy variable equal to 1 if j belongs to group g.
Using equations (2) and (3) and defining the mean utility
for product j, δjt ≡ xjtβ + ξjt , we can write consumer i’s
conditional indirect utility (1) as
uijt = δjt + xjtΣνi +
∑G
g=1 djgtζigt + (1 − ρ)εijt . (4)
Indirect utility thus contains consumer heterogeneity for the
continuous characteristics xjt and consumer heterogeneity for
the group dummy variables djgt . The heterogeneity in the
valuations for djgt follows the specific distributional assump-
tions of the nested logit. As an alternative, one may include
djgt in the xjt vector. This potentially creates more flexibil-
ity; in particular, it also allows one to incorporate correlation
in the random coefficients for the continuous and discrete
6 In principle, one may also specify nonzero off-diagonal elements in Σ
to allow consumer valuations to be correlated across characteristics.
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characteristics. This will come, however, at an increased com-
putational cost. We can see several special cases in equation
(4). If σk = 0 for all elements in Σ, we obtain the standard
nested logit model. If ρ = 0, we obtain BLP’s random coef-
ficients logit model. And if all σk = ρ = 0, the simple logit
model results.
Each consumer i in market t chooses the product j that
maximizes her utility. With the above assumptions, the condi-
tional probability that consumer i chooses product j in market
t takes the nested logit form,
πjt(δt , θ, νi) = exp
((
δjt + xjtΣνi
)
/ (1 − ρ))
exp
(
Iig/ (1 − ρ)
) exp Iig
exp Ii
, (5)
where θ = (β, σ, ρ) and Iig and Ii are McFadden’s (1978)
“inclusive values” defined by
Iig = (1 − ρ) ln
∑Jg
k=1 exp ((δkt + xktΣνi) / (1 − ρ)) ,
Ii = ln
(
1 +
∑G
g=1 exp Iig
)
,
and Jg is the number of products in segment g such that∑G
g=1 Jg = J . The unconditional choice probability or
aggregate market share of product j in market t is
sjt(δt , θ) =
∫
πjt(δt , θ, ν)φ(ν)dν, (6)
which simplifies to BLP’s random coefficients logit model if
ρ = 0. The market share integral may be approximated using
Monte Carlo integration as in BLP or using quadrature rules
as suggested by Judd and Skrainka (2011).
To estimate the demand parameters θ, we follow Berry
(1994), BLP, and the subsequent literature. We equate the
observed market share vector (i.e., unit sales per product
divided by the number of potential consumers Lt) to the
predicted market share vector, st = st(δt , θ). We solve this
system for δt in each market t using fixed-point iteration on
δr+1t ≡ δrt + ln(st) − (1 − ρ) ln(st(δrt )) (7)
until convergence is reached (δr+1t ≈ δrt ). This is a slight
modification of BLP’s contraction mapping: it dampens the
final term by 1 − ρ (see also Brenkers & Verboven, 2006).
In appendix A we show that this dampening is necessary to
satisfy the conditions for a contraction mapping in nested
logit models when ρ is sufficiently high (as opposed to logit
models where dampening is not needed). Since the error term
enters additively in δt , solving for δt gives a solution for the
error term ξjt for each product j = 1, . . . , J in market t. We
can then interact this with a set of instruments providing the
moment conditions to proceed with GMM, as we discuss in
more detail in section 3.
B. Monte Carlo Experiments
Overview. Before analyzing the car market data we
consider two setups of Monte Carlo experiments. Setup 1
generates data sets according to RC models. We specify one
normally distributed random coefficient for a discrete prod-
uct characteristic, a dummy variable for the product’s group.
We focus on the performance of estimating misspecified NL
models, where the nests are defined according to the same
group dummy variable. For a wide range of designs, we find
that the NL model approximates the substitution patterns
of the RC model very well, so the different distributional
assumptions do not matter much.
Setup 2 goes a step further and also includes consumer
heterogeneity for a continuous product characteristic. We
generate data sets according to the more general RCNL
models, with one normally distributed random coefficient
for a continuous product characteristic (price) and one nest-
ing parameter for the group dummy variable. Across all our
designs, we obtain the following robust conclusions. While
the logit, NL, and RC models yield biased parameter esti-
mates of the true RCNL model, only the logit model generates
implausible substitution patterns. The RC model provides
a better approximation of the own-price elasticities than
the NL model. Furthermore, in contrast to the logit model,
both the RC and the NL models yield stronger substitution
within than between groups (although all models underesti-
mate the cross-price elasticities between products of the same
group).
We focus most of the discussion on substitution biases from
estimating misspecified models. But we also take the oppor-
tunity to briefly comment on the numerical performance of
the different models in light of the recent literature on these
issues.
Setup. We conduct a large number of Monte Carlo exper-
iments in two main setups: an RC model for a discrete
characteristic and an RCNL model. For each experiment we
generate 1,000 data sets. Each data set consists of T = 50
independent markets and J = 25 products per market. Each
product j in each market t has an observed characteristics vec-
tor xjt = (1, x1jt , djt): a constant, one continuous characteristic
x1jt (the price variable), and one discrete characteristic djt , a
dummy variable referring to the product’s group or nest (seg-
ment 0 or 1). Furthermore, each product has an unobserved
product characteristic ξjt , which is drawn from a standard nor-
mal distribution and uncorrelated with xjt . We thus abstract
from the issue of endogeneity of some product characteris-
tics (typically price), since we want to focus on comparing
the performance of misspecified models.7
We draw the continuous price variable x1jt from a log-
normal distribution, which ensures positive realizations and
roughly mimics the distribution of prices in empirical data
sets. It will be convenient to treat the dummy variable for the
7 For a recent discussion on the endogeneity of product characteristics,
and the role of instruments in the GMM context, see Armstrong (2012) and
Reynaert and Verboven (2014).
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product’s group djt as the realization of a latent continuous
variable d∗jt . More specifically, assume that(
ln x1jt
d∗jt
)
∼ N
(
0
0
,
1 ςxd
ςxd 1
)
,
and djt = 1{d∗jt>γ}. In the Monte Carlo designs we can vary
ςxd , the correlation between d∗jt and x1jt , to capture the extent to
which the product’s group is informative about the continuous
characteristic. We can also vary the cutoff point γ to set the
number of products allocated in groups 0 and 1. Unless stated
otherwise, we set ςxd = 0 and γ = 0 as the default values.
We specify a broad range of preference parameters: the
mean valuations β = (β0, βx1 , βd), the standard deviations
σ = (σ0, σx1 , σd), and the nesting parameter ρ. We discuss the
various parameter designs in more detail in the next section,
where we explain the results for our two main setups.
The market shares are computed from the market share
equation (6) using the generated product characteristics (xjt
and ξjt) and the assumed demand parameters θ = (β, σ, ρ).
To approximate the market share integral (6) over the normal
random variable vector νi, we use an accurate polynomial-
based sparse grid quadrature rule as suggested by Judd and
Skrainka (2011),
sjt(δt , θ) ≈
∑N
i=1 ϕi
exp
((
δjt + xjtΣνi
)
/ (1 − ρ))
exp
(
Ig/ (1 − ρ)
) exp Ig
exp I
,
(8)
where we use nine nodes appropriately weighted by ϕi.8 Since
our focus is not on numerical integration error, we use the
same set of nodes and weights to compute the market share
in the DGP and the estimation.
For each design and its associated 1,000 data sets, we
use GMM to estimate the correctly specified model and the
other, misspecified models. In all cases, we generate the set
of instruments from within the model, following Chamber-
lain’s (1987) approach as applied in Berry et al. (1999). Given
the demand parameters θ = (β, σ, ρ), this instrument vec-
tor is the expected value of ∂ξjt(θ)/∂θ′. This includes the
characteristics vector itself (xjt) and nonlinear functions of
the characteristics and the parameters. Finally, following the
recent literature we consider multiple starting values, a state-
of-the-art optimization algorithm (Knitro 8.0), and a tight
inner loop contraction mapping.
Results setup 1: RC model for discrete characteristic. We
specify RC models with only a random coefficient for the
discrete characteristic djt and no other consumer heterogene-
ity. More specifically, we assume that the mean valuations
are β = (−1, −2, −0.5), the standard deviations are σ =
(0, 0, σd), and the nesting parameter is ρ = 0.9 We consider
8 A relatively low number of nodes is needed for accurate integration: with
nine nodes, the unidimensional market share integral is exact at accuracy
level 17.
9 The choice of the mean valuations β is based on obtaining a realistic
setting in which the outside good market share varies between 0.10 and
0.70 under the different data-generating processes.
Figure 1.—Relationship between Heterogeneity Parameters in the
RC and NL Models
The relationship between the mean of the estimated ρ in the misspecified NL model against the mean of
the estimated σd in the correctly specified RC model. The estimates are based on 1,000 random samples of
50 markets and 25 products. The true model is the RC model with 10 different designs: σd = 0.5; 1 . . . 5.
ten designs for σd , varying over 0.5, 1, . . . , 5.10 For each
design and each of the 1,000 generated data sets, we estimate
both the correctly specified RC model and the misspecified
NL and logit models. The RC and NL models differ only in the
distributional assumptions regarding consumer heterogeneity
for the discrete characteristic djt (normal versus generalized
extreme value). This comparison thus enables us to assess
to what extent ρ takes over the role of σd and whether the
misspecified NL model provides a good approximation for
the price elasticities of the correctly specified RC model.11
Figure 1 plots the mean of the estimated ρ in the misspec-
ified NL models against the mean of the estimated σd in the
correctly specified RC models for the ten different designs.
There is a clear increasing relationship between the estimated
ρ and σd . The estimated nesting parameter ρ thus captures the
omitted random coefficient σd . Furthermore, ρ is increasing
in σd at a decreasing rate. Hence, ρ remains in the unit interval
even for high values of σd , consistent with the assumptions
of the NL model.
Table 1 shows more detailed estimation results for two
of the ten designs: limited consumer heterogeneity for the
discrete characteristic (σd = 1) and strong heterogeneity
(σd = 5). The top part shows the mean and standard deviation
of the main parameters as estimated from the 1,000 gener-
ated data sets. We first look at the parameters for the correctly
specified RC model. For both designs, the means of βx1 and σd
are very close to the true parameters, their standard deviations
are fairly small, and the distribution is approximately normal
(as confirmed by Q-Q plots, not shown). This confirms that
10 We took the default values for the correlation between d∗jt and x1jt ,
ςxd = 0 and for the cutoff point of belonging to group 0 or 1, γ = 0.
We also experimented with different values of ςxd and γ, and this gives
robust conclusions.
11 We have also conducted the reverse group of experiments: we spec-
ify an NL model and compare the estimates of the correctly specified
NL model with those of a misspecified RC model. We use the same
mean valuation vector and consider ten designs for the nesting parame-
ter, ρ = 0.10, 0.15, . . . , 0.50. We obtain comparable results, as reported in
online appendix B.
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Table 1.—Monte Carlo Results Setup 1: RC Model for Discrete Characteristic
True σd = 1 True σd = 5
Parameter Logit NL RC Logit NL RC
βx1 −2.00 −1.83 −2.00 −1.98 −1.16 −2.00
(0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05) (0.18) (0.04)
σd NA NA 1.00 NA NA 5.05
(0.36) (0.45)
ρ NA 0.09 NA NA 0.42 NA
(0.08) (0.12)
Own elasticity −2.607 −2.610 −2.607 −2.579 −2.599 −2.582
(0.404) (0.405) (0.405) (0.400) (0.404) (0.404)
Cross-elasticity, same segment 0.037 0.042 0.043 0.037 0.052 0.056
(0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Cross-elasticity, different segment 0.037 0.034 0.032 0.038 0.028 0.021
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005)
Model selection criteria
GMM-AIC 1 263 736 0 6 994
GMM-BIC 2 262 736 0 6 994
The table reports the empirical means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of selected parameters, the implied price elasticities for T = 1, and two information criteria, GMM-BIC and GMM-AIC. The estimates
are based on 1,000 random samples of 50 markets and 25 products. The true model is the RC model of setup 1 with two designs: σd = 1 and σd = 5.
our estimation procedure, with a state-of-the-art optimiza-
tion algorithm, analytical derivatives, numerical integration,
and a tight inner loop contraction mapping, works well in
practice.12
Next, we consider the parameters of the misspecified mod-
els. The price parameter βx1 is close to the true value of−2 in the misspecified logit model. In contrast, it appears
to differ significantly from the true value in the misspecified
NL model, especially in the second design with strong con-
sumer heterogeneity (̂βx1 = −1.16 > −2). However, this
is entirely due to the significance of the nesting parameter
ρ, which rescales all utility parameters. Indeed, the rescaled
price parameter βx1/(1 − ρ) is very close to the true value of−2.
What do these findings imply for the estimated price elas-
ticities? The middle part of table 1 shows that the own-price
elasticities of the logit and NL models are very close to the
ones in the RC model (on average about −2.57 for all mod-
els). Furthermore, the cross-price elasticities of the NL model
are also quite close to those of the RC model, with stronger
substitution within than between groups (especially in the
second design with σd = 5). In contrast, the logit model
yields symmetric substitution patterns. Hence, although the
NL model resulted in a biased price parameter, the nesting
parameter ρ accounts for the omitted σd , so that the bias in the
cross-price effects is very small. As expected, the NL model
especially improves on the logit model in the second design
with strong consumer heterogeneity (σd = 5).
Finally, we calculated the AIC and BIC model selection
criteria, as developed in the GMM framework by Andrews
(1999). Most interesting, in the design with limited consumer
heterogeneity (σd = 1), both selection criteria have diffi-
culties distinguishing between the misspecified NL and the
true RC model: they incorrectly pick the NL model as the
12 Note that the nesting parameter ρ enters nonlinearly in the choice prob-
abilities. This may be another source of multiple minima and sensitivity to
starting values. However, in our GMM context, we did not find the issue to
be larger than in the models without ρ.
true data-generating process in up to 26% of the 1,000 cases.
In contrast, in the design with strong consumer heterogene-
ity (σd = 5), both selection criteria correctly detect the RC
model as the true model in almost all cases.
Note that we also implemented the reverse Monte Carlo
experiments, where the NL model is the true data-generating
process and the RC model is the misspecified model (reported
in online appendix B). We can draw analogous conclusions:
the RC model captures the asymmetric substitution patterns
of the NL model quite well, with only minor differences
because of different distributional assumptions. This finding
is consistent with McFadden and Train (2000), who showed
that any random utility model (so also a NL model) can be
approximated by a random coefficients logit model.
To summarize, in contrast with the logit model, a misspeci-
fied NL model results in comparable asymmetric substitution
patterns as the true RC model (and vice versa). In fact, it
is quite difficult to formally distinguish between the NL
and RC models for low levels of consumer heterogeneity.
Hence, when consumer heterogeneity mainly refers to a dis-
crete characteristic, the computationally tractable NL model
may often be preferable to the RC model (unless there are
strong reasons to expect a specific functional form for the
distribution for consumer heterogeneity).
Results setup 2: RCNL model. We now specify RCNL
models with a random coefficient for the continuous char-
acteristic x1jt and a nesting parameter ρ for the group
dummy variable. More specifically, we assume that β =
(−1, −3, −2), σ = (0, σx1 , 0) and take various values for ρ.13
We consider eight designs according to three criteria. Firstly,
set either σx1 = 1.0 and ρ = 0.3, or σx1 = 0.5 and ρ = 0.5:
the first case is closer to an RC model, whereas the second
case is closer to an NL model. Second, set the cutoff point
13 The choice of the mean valuations β is again based on obtaining a
realistic setting for the outside good market share, varying between 0.20
and 0.83.
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Table 2.—Monte Carlo Results Setup 2: RCNL Model (One Design)
Coefficients True Parameter Logit NL RC RCNL
β0 −1 −2.89 −0.16 −1.60 −1.00
(0.06) (0.20) (0.09) (0.16)
βd −2 −0.44 −5.66 −0.86 −2.01
(0.15) (0.46) (0.12) (0.30)
βx1 −3 −1.94 −0.31 −4.06 −2.99
(0.06) (0.13) (0.16) (0.27)
ρ 0.3 n/a 0.88 n/a 0.30
(0.07) (0.07)
σx1 1 n/a n/a 1.30 1.00
(0.06) (0.08)
Own elasticity −2.545 −3.347 −5.205 −5.344
(0.397) (1.513) (0.820) (0.860)
Cross-elasticity, same segment 0.028 0.093 0.083 0.112
(0.007) (0.058) (0.020) (0.032)
Cross-elasticity, different segment 0.015 0.002 0.082 0.057
(0.004) (0.001) (0.024) (0.017)
Model selection criteria
AIC 0 0 0 1000
BIC 0 0 0 1000
The table reports the empirical means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the parameters, the implied price elasticities for T = 1, and two information criteria, GMM-BIC and GMM-AIC. The estimates are
based on 1,000 random samples of 50 markets and 25 products. The true model is the RCNL model of setup 2 with the following design: σx1 = 1.0 and ρ = 0.3; ςxd = 0.9; γ = 1.
for belonging to group 0 or 1 at either γ = 0 or γ = 1: in
the first case both groups are equally crowded, while in the
second case, group 0 is more crowded than group 1. Finally,
we set either ςxd = 0 or ςxd = 0.9: in the first case, the group
dummy djt is not informative about the continuous character-
istic x1jt , while in the second case, djt is very informative about
x1jt . For each design and each of the 1,000 generated data sets,
we estimate the correctly specified RCNL model and the mis-
specified models (RC with ρ = 0, NL with σx1 = 0 and logit
with ρ = σx1 = 0). These experiments enable us to see to
what extent ρ takes over the role of σx1 (and vice versa) and
what this implies for the price elasticity estimates under a
broad variety of designs.
Table 2 shows detailed results for one of the eight designs:
σx1 = 0.5 and ρ = 0.5, γ = 1, and ςxd = 0.9. We begin
with this design because it best mimics our car data set.
First, there is relatively strong consumer heterogeneity for
the group dummy (high ρ); second, more products belong to
group 0 than to group 1 (84% versus 16% of the products); and
third, the group dummy is quite informative for the continu-
ous characteristic x1jt (probit regressions of the group dummy
on the continuous characteristic imply 88.4% correct classi-
fications, where group 0 tends to contain the low-price goods
and group 1 the high-priced goods).
We first look at the parameter estimates of the correctly
specified RCNL model. The means are very close to the
true parameters, the standard errors are small, and the dis-
tribution is approximately normal (not shown). This again
confirms that our estimation procedure works well in practice,
as well as in the RCNL model where we used the modified
contraction mapping.
The parameter estimates for the logit, NL, and RC models
give interesting results on the effects of estimating misspeci-
fied models. The NL model, which imposes σx1 = 0, leads to
an upward bias of the mean valuation of x1jt and of the nesting
parameter ρ: βx1 = −0.31 > −3 and ρ = 0.88 > 0.3. The
RC model, which imposes ρ = 0, also results in parameter
biases: βx1 = −4.06 < −3 and σx1 = 1.30 > 1.0. Hence,
the nesting parameter ρ and the standard deviation σx1 partly
take the role of the other omitted parameter.
What do these estimates imply for the substitution pat-
terns? The own-price elasticities tend to be underestimated
(in absolute value) in the logit and NL models; in the RC
model, they are relatively close to the estimates of the cor-
rectly specified RCNL model. The cross-price elasticities
between products of the same group are underestimated in
all misspecified models (logit, NL, and RC). This confirms
the importance of accounting for all sources of consumer
heterogeneity (regarding the continuous variable and group
dummy). Finally, the cross-price elasticities between prod-
ucts of different groups are underestimated in the NL model
and overestimated in the RC model.14
These findings refer to one of the eight designs (the design
that is closest to our empirical data set below). However,
as we show in table 3, our main conclusions remain across
all dimensions of the designs. The RC model estimates the
own-price elasticities quite well (i.e., close to the ones from
the correctly specified RCNL model), whereas the logit and
NL models tend to underestimate the own-price elastici-
ties (but the NL model less so when the nesting parameter
is strong). The logit, RC, and NL models underestimate
substitution within groups, since they do not capture all
sources of consumer heterogeneity. The RC model overes-
timates substitution between different groups, while the NL
model underestimates it. Despite these biases, the NL and
14 Note that the AIC and BIC selection criteria now correctly detect that
the data-generating process is the RCNL model in all of the 1,000 generated
data sets. Hence, they always lead to the conclusion that one should account
for both sources of heterogeneity (on the continuous characteristic and on
the group dummy). This differs from setup 1, where the selection criteria
often could not distinguish between the NL and RC models (because the
group dummy was the only source of heterogeneity).
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Table 3.—Monte Carlo Results Setup 2: Own- and Cross-Elasticity under Different Designs of RCNL Model
Logit NL RC RCNL Logit NL RC RCNL
σx1 = 1.0 and ρ = 0.3 σx1 = 0.5 and ρ = 0.5
ςxd = 0, γ = 0
Own elasticity −2.355 −2.598 −5.412 −5.410 −5.761 −5.838 −7.694 −7.797
Cross-elasticity, same segment 0.020 0.064 0.086 0.123 0.041 0.113 0.071 0.144
Cross-elasticity, different segment 0.021 0.005 0.090 0.063 0.043 0.015 0.073 0.035
ςxd = 0.9, γ = 0
Own elasticity −2.025 −2.383 −5.411 −5.411 −5.685 −5.745 −7.691 −7.721
Cross-elasticity, same segment 0.017 0.096 0.088 0.145 0.043 0.156 0.067 0.200
Cross-elasticity, different segment 0.018 0.005 0.068 0.049 0.045 0.020 0.075 0.037
ςxd = 0, γ = 1
Own elasticity −2.396 −2.729 −5.380 −5.408 −5.747 −5.818 −7.645 −7.780
Cross-elasticity, same segment 0.025 0.048 0.099 0.114 0.050 0.080 0.082 0.113
Cross-elasticity, different segment 0.016 0.004 0.065 0.044 0.033 0.014 0.056 0.027
ςxd = 0.9, γ = 1
Own elasticity −2.545 −3.347 −5.205 −5.344 −5.887 −5.879 −7.699 −7.573
Cross-elasticity, same segment 0.028 0.093 0.083 0.112 0.054 0.106 0.083 0.141
Cross-elasticity, different segment 0.015 0.002 0.082 0.057 0.029 0.014 0.060 0.025
The table reports the empirical means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the price elasticities for T = 1. The estimates are based on 1,000 random samples of 50 markets and 25 products. The true model is
the RCNL model of setup 2, with eight different designs according to three criteria: (a) σx1 = 1.0 and ρ = 0.3, or σx1 = 0.5 and ρ = 0.5; (b) ςxd = 0 or ςxd = 0.9; or (c) γ = 0 or γ = 1.
RC models find stronger substitution within than between
groups, in contrast with the logit where substitution is entirely
symmetric.15 These findings will be confirmed in the next
sections, where we provide an empirical analysis of the car
market.
More generally, these findings stress the importance of
accounting for unobserved consumer heterogeneity regard-
ing group dummy variables. But this does not mean that
researchers should necessarily estimate an RCNL model
when they expect unobserved heterogeneity on group dummy
variables. They may also specify an RC model with an
additional random coefficient for the group dummy vari-
able. To illustrate this, online appendix B provides results
from a Monte Carlo experiment with one random coeffi-
cient on a continuous variable and one on a discrete variable.
We find that omitting the random coefficient on the dis-
crete variable results in very similar biases as the earlier
findings on omitting the nesting parameter from the RCNL
model.16
15 The cross-price elasticities in the logit model do not appear to be entirely
symmetric in the two lower panels (designs 5–8, withγ = 1). This is because
one of the two groups is less crowded than the other. The cross-elasticities
are symmetric if one considers them at a more disaggregate level (e.g.,
average separately for group 0 and 1).
16 As a further check, we also compared the Monte Carlo results from
the RCNL (last column of table 2) with an RC model with two ran-
dom coefficients—one on the continuous variable and one on the discrete
variable. This model is “misspecified” since it has different distributional
assumptions about the discrete variable than the RCNL model. But the
implied own-price and cross-price elasticities are very close (respectively
−5.727, 0.114, 0.064, compared with −5.344, 0.112 and 0.054 for the
RCNL model in table 2). This generalizes our findings in the simpler setup
of table 1.
III. Empirical Analysis
A. Data set for the European Car Market
We make use of a unique data set on the automobile mar-
ket maintained by JATO. The data are at the level of the car
model (e.g., VW Golf) and include essentially all passen-
ger cars sold during nine years (1998–2006) in nine West
European countries. This covers around 90% of the sales
in the European Union. The countries are Belgium, France,
Great Britain, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and
the Netherlands. For each model, country, and year, we have
information on sales, defined as total new registrations. For
models introduced or eliminated within a given year, we know
the number of months with positive sales in the given year.
We exclude the models with extremely small market shares
(e.g., Bentley Arnage or Kia Clarus). This results in a data
set of 18,643 model/country/year observations or on average
about 230 models per country/year.
We combine the sales data with information on the
list prices and various characteristics referring to the base
model: vehicle size (curb weight, width, and height), engine
attributes (horsepower and displacement), and fuel consump-
tion (liter/100 km or euros /100 km). We start from JATO’s
classification to assign each model to one of seven possi-
ble marketing segments: subcompact, compact, intermediate,
standard, luxury, SUV, and sports. Furthermore, we assign
the models to their brands’ perceived country of origin. For
example, the Volkswagen Golf is perceived of German origin
even if produced in Spain. We construct a dummy vari-
able for whether a model is of foreign or domestic origin
in each country. Our two-level nested logit model will use
the marketing segments and foreign origin dummy to define
the groups (e.g., subcompact) and subgroups (e.g., domestic
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Table 4.—Summary Statistics
All countries France Germany
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Sales (units) 5,785 14,694 8,440 19,931 11,432 21,074
Price/income 1.19 0.94 0.90 0.53 0.95 0.63
Horsepower (in kW) 88.8 40.9 87.7 37.4 92.8 44.6
Fuel efficiency (euros /100 km) 8.4 2.1 8.5 2.3 8.8 2.6
Width (cm) 173.0 8.5 173.1 8.5 173.4 8.6
Height (cm) 148.3 13.8 149.2 14.2 148.2 14.1
Foreign (0–1) 0.92 0.28 0.86 0.35 0.71 0.45
Months present (1–12) 9.89 2.55 9.70 2.65 9.77 2.56
Means and standard deviations of the main variables. The total number of observations (models/markets) is 18,643, where markets refer to the nine countries and nine years.
Table 5.—Summary Statistics by Segment
Segment Subcompact Compact Intermediate Standard Luxury SUV Sport
Mean of the characteristics
Sales (units) 11,155 7,450 5,009 4,632 2,889 2,205 1,517
Price/income 0.55 0.81 1.04 1.39 2.13 1.61 1.85
Horsepower (in kW) 48.7 70.1 84.6 99.6 134.0 113.7 126.6
Fuel efficiency (euros /100 km) 6.4 7.2 8.0 8.7 10.4 11.2 9.6
Width (cm) 162.5 171.4 175.3 175.1 182.3 179.4 175.1
Height (cm) 149.1 144.2 144.9 142.6 145.3 175.9 133.6
Foreign (0–1) 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.96 0.86
Months present (1–12) 9.72 9.87 9.88 9.77 9.94 10.11 10.03
Number of observations 3,788 4,095 2,656 1,711 1,764 2,521 2,108
Correct classifications into different marketing segments (in percent)
Subcompact – 93.7 99.4 99.9 100.0 95.5 97.6
Compact – 76.6 91.1 97.7 99.7 92.8
Intermediate – 77.9 91.4 99.7 91.0
Standard – 90.0 99.9 84.4
Luxury – 99.7 88.9
SUV – 99.9
Sports –
The top panel reports means of the main variables per segment. The bottom panel reports the percentage of correctly classified car models, based on binary probit of a segment dummy per pair on four continuous
characteristics (horsepower, fuel efficiency, width, and height).
subcompact, foreign subcompact). Table 4 provides summary
statistics for sales, price, and the product characteristics used
in our empirical demand model. We show the summary statis-
tics for all countries and for France and Germany separately
(since we will focus on these countries when we present our
counterfactuals).
Since our empirical analysis will focus on comparing
the nested logit and random coefficients logit models, it is
informative to provide background on how the continuous
characteristics relate to the marketing segments. Table 5 (top
panel) shows summary statistics for our four characteristics
by marketing segment. Cars belonging to the same marketing
segment tend to have similar horsepower, fuel consump-
tion, width, and height. Horsepower and fuel consumption
show a higher dispersion within a segment than width and
height, but their segment averages also vary more widely.
For example, average horsepower varies from 48.7 kW in
the subcompact to 134 kW in the luxury segment, whereas
average width varies from 162.5 cm in the subcompact to
182.3 cm in the luxury segment. Table 5 (bottom panel)
summarizes how well the four characteristics predict which
segment each model belongs to. For each segment pair (e.g.,
subcompact-compact), we estimate a probit explaining seg-
ment assignment as a function of the four characteristics and
ask how often the probit correctly classifies the different car
models. The table shows that the continuous variables predict
the SUV extremely well, with over 95% correct classifica-
tions with respect to any other segment. Classification is also
quite accurate for most other segments; for example, for the
luxury segment, there are over 89% correct classifications
with respect to any other segment. The lowest number of
correct classifications occurs for a few neighboring segments
(on the diagonal), for example, 76.6% correct classifica-
tions between compact and intermediate, 77.9% between
intermediate and standard. But even in these instances, the
characteristics predict the segments quite well.
In sum, this preliminary evidence indicates that a limited
number of characteristics (horsepower, fuel consumption,
width, and height) have quite good, but not perfect, predictive
power for the classification in marketing segments. We will
bear this in mind when comparing the NL and RC models.
B. Specification
To estimate the logit, NL, RC, and RCNL demand mod-
els, we make three modifications to the framework dis-
cussed in section II. First, we treat price separately since
it is an endogenous characteristic and since we allow its
NESTED LOGIT OR RANDOM COEFFICIENTS LOGIT? 925
random coefficient to follow the empirical distribution of
income. We adopt the following variant of the above utility
specification (1):
uijt = xjtβi − αipjt + ξjt + εijt .
The vector of observed product characteristics, xjt , includes
horsepower, fuel efficiency, width, height, and a dummy
variable for the product’s country of origin (domestic or for-
eign). The corresponding random coefficients are specified
as before: βik = βk + σkνik for characteristic k. Price pjt
enters slightly differently: its random coefficient is specified
as αi = α/yi, where yi is the income of individual i. In the
RC and RCNL model, we treat yi as a random variable with
a known distribution equal to the empirical distribution of
income. In the NL model, we treat yi as nonrandom and set
it equal to mean income in market t, yi = yt . In sum, for
the nonprice characteristics, we estimate both the mean valu-
ationsβk and the standard deviationsσk; for price, we estimate
only α so that heterogeneity in willingness to pay follows the
empirical distribution of income.17
Second, the product-specific taste parameter εijt follows
the distributional assumptions of the two-level nested logit
model instead of the one-level nested logit of section II. The
upper level consists of the seven different market segments
(subcompact, compact, standard, intermediate, luxury, SUV,
and sports) and one separate segment for the outside good.
The lower level divides every segment in two subsegments
according to the models’ country of origin (domestic or for-
eign). In four countries, there are only foreign cars, so the
subsegments of domestic cars are empty (Belgium, Greece,
Portugal, and the Netherlands). There are now two nesting
parameters, ρ = (ρ1, ρ2). The nesting parameter ρ1 measures
the correlation of preferences across cars of the same sub-
segment, and ρ2 measures correlation of preferences across
subsegments of the same segment. For the model to be con-
sistent with random utility maximization, 0 ≤ ρ2 ≤ ρ1 < 1.
If ρ1 = ρ2, the model reduces to a one-level nested logit
where the segments are the nests; if ρ1 > ρ2 = 0, the model
reduces to a one-level nested logit where the subsegments
are the nests. If ρ1 = ρ2 = 0, the model reduces to a sim-
ple logit. Assuming that consumers choose the product that
maximizes utility, we obtain a two-level nested logit version
of the aggregate market shares, equation (6).
Third, we exploit the panel features of our data set to
specify the error term as ξjt = ξj + ξt + Δξjt . The ξj are
product fixed effects, capturing time-invariant unobserved
characteristics for a car model j. The ξt are market fixed
effects, modeled as country-specific fixed effects interacted
with a time trend and squared time trend. These capture
17 This utility specification approximates BLP’s Cobb-Douglas specifica-
tion α ln(yi − pj) when the price is small relative to (capitalized) income. It
is particularly convenient when studying countries with different exchange
rates, since local price is simply expressed relative to local income (see
Goldberg & Verboven, 2001).
general country-specific demand shocks relative to the out-
side good.18 Finally,Δξjt is the residual, capturing remaining
unobserved product characteristics, varying across products
and markets. Since our data are at the annual level, we also
include a set of dummy variables for the number of months
each model was available in a country within a given year
(for models introduced or dropped within a year).
C. Identification and Estimation
To estimate the demand parameters θ = (β, α, σ, ρ), we
follow Berry (1994), BLP, and the subsequent literature. We
solve the system st = st(δt , θ) for δt in each market t to obtain
a solution for the error termΔξjt for each product j = 1, . . . , J
in market t:
δjt(st , α, σ, ρ) = xjtβ+ ξj + ξt +Δξjt . (9)
In the (two-level) NL model, the left-hand side has an
analytic solution,
δjt(st , α, σ, ρ) = ln sjt/s0t − ρ1 ln sj|hgt − ρ2 ln sh|gt
+ αpjt/y, (10)
so that a linear estimator can be used. In the RC and
RCNL model, δjt(st , α, σ, ρ) should be computed numerically
by solving the system st = st(δt , θ) for δt , which makes
estimation considerably more complex.
For all models, we can proceed with GMM by interacting
the error term with a vector of instrumental variables zjt that
is uncorrelated with the error term. Since there are 2K + 3
parameters (K mean valuations βk , K standard deviations σk ,
the price parameter α, and the two nesting parameters ρ1 and
ρ2), we need at least 2K + 3 instruments in zjt . Price pjt does
not qualify as an instrument to identify the price effect, since
it is likely to be correlated with Δξjt . For example, a pos-
itive demand shock for product j in market t will not only
increase the demand for the product but may also induce the
firm to raise its price. Failure to account for this endogene-
ity issue will lead to an estimated price coefficient (α) that
is downward biased.19 Our identification assumption is that
the observed product characteristics xjt are uncorrelated with
the unobserved product characteristicsΔξjt (which is weaker
than the often adopted assumption that xjt is uncorrelated with
ξjt). As discussed in BLP, one may use alternative functions
of these characteristics as instruments to estimate the 2K + 3
parameters. More specifically, following previous practice,
our vector of instrumental variables zjt includes: the vector of
product characteristics xjt , the sum of the characteristics of
18 We set the potential number of consumers Lt as the number of house-
holds in the market. Alternative assumptions on Lt are absorbed in the
market fixed effects and do not have an important impact on the results, as
we discuss below.
19 In the linear NL model, the within-subgroup and within-group market
shares ln sj|hgt and ln sh|gt evidently do not qualify as instruments to identify
the nesting parameters ρ1 and ρ2 (just like functions of market shares would
not qualify as instruments for the distributional parameters σ in the RC
model).
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Table 6.—Parameter Estimates for Alternative Demand Models
Logit Nested Logit RC Logit RC Nested Logit
Parameter SE Parameter SE Parameter SE Parameter SE
Mean valuations for the characteristics in xjt (β)
Price/income −1.76 0.17 −1.00 0.03 −5.52 0.66 −2.75 0.18
Horsepower (kW/100) 2.30 0.24 1.34 0.08 −3.67 1.86 0.57 0.77
Fuel (euros /10,000 km) −11.48 1.43 −6.13 0.52 −20.77 3.06 −4.68 0.73
Width (cm/100) 2.51 0.55 −0.10 0.29 3.64 0.83 1.26 0.50
Height (cm/100) 3.46 0.35 1.17 0.19 0.27 1.32 2.12 0.46
Foreign (0/1) −1.21 0.03 −0.47 0.04 −3.66 0.89 −0.57 0.14
Standard deviations of valuations for the characteristics in xjt (σ)
Horsepower (kW/100) NA NA 4.67 0.83 0.92 0.41
Fuel (euros /10,000 km) NA NA 1.15 1.69 1.66 0.57
Width (cm/100) NA NA 1.93 0.71 0.10 1.74
Height (cm/100) NA NA 4.83 0.55 0.15 1.11
Foreign (0/1) NA NA 5.46 1.05 0.22 0.84
Constant NA NA 1.18 0.43 0.21 3.00
Nesting parameters (ρ1 and ρ2)
Subsegment ρ1 NA 0.65 0.03 NA 0.57 0.03
Segment ρ2 NA 0.48 0.03 NA 0.47 0.07
Model fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income distribution No No Yes Yes
Random coefficients No No Yes Yes
# inelastic demands 3,514 (19%) 556 (3%) 0 0
χ2 test ρ1 = ρ2 NA 83.04 NA 2.76
Prob. χ2 (0.00) (0.10)
Parameter estimates and standard errors for the different demand models. The logit and NL models assume equal income (−α/yt ), and the RC and RCNL models allow for heterogeneous income (−α/yi). The total
number of observations (models/markets) is 18,643, where markets refer to the nine countries and nine years.
other products of competing firms, and the sum of the char-
acteristics of other products of the same firm. For the NL and
RCNL models, we also include these sums over products
belonging to the same subsegment and segment, following
Verboven (1996).20
The GMM objective function includes a weighting matrix
to account for heteroskedasticity (obtained from the residuals
using a two-step procedure). To minimize the GMM objective
function with respect to the parameters θ = (β, α, σ, ρ), we
first concentrate out the linear parameters β (which includes
a set of dummy variables for the market fixed effects ξt).
We do not directly estimate the more than 200 car model
fixed effects ξj; instead we use a within transformation of the
data (Baltagi, 1995). Standard errors are computed using the
standard GMM formulas for asymptotic standard errors.
A few recent papers have studied several numerical dif-
ficulties with estimating the RC model (which also apply
to the RCNL model): global convergence problems and the
role of starting values and different optimization algorithms
(Knittel & Metaxoglou, 2012), problems with numerically
solving δt using BLP’s contracting mapping (Dubé et al.,
2012), and problems with approximating the integral over
the logit probabilities using simulation (Judd & Skrainka,
2011).
We draw lessons from this recent literature and proceed as
follows. First, to approximate the high-dimensional integral,
equation (6), we make use of a large number of Halton draws
over the density N(0, 1). This provides a more effective cov-
erage of the density domain than pseudo-random draws. In
20 Weak instruments tests show that the instruments are jointly significant.
particular, we take a large number of 500 Halton draws for
each of the 81 markets (country/years).21 Second, to ensure
the GMM objective function is smooth, we use a tight toler-
ance level of 1e−12 to invert the shares using our modification
of BLP’s contraction mapping, equation (7). This tolerance
level is considerably stricter than typically used in the liter-
ature. Third, we program analytic derivatives of the gradient
of the objective function. While this is particularly tedious
for the RCNL model, it greatly improves accuracy and com-
putation time. Finally, even if the GMM objective function is
smooth, it may not be globally convex. To minimize the func-
tion with respect to the nonlinear parameters (α, σ, ρ), we use
different starting values, using a stringent convergence crite-
rion of 1e−6 and carefully examining the gradient, the solution
path, and the Hessian eigenvalues. We use a BFGS algorithm,
an efficient procedure that uses information at different points
to obtain a sense of the curvature of the objective function.
We usually obtain the same optimum, except for very high
or low starting values, but in these cases, the value of the
objective function at convergence is always higher.22
D. Parameter Estimates
Table 6 shows the parameter estimates for the four demand
models. The logit model imposes σ = ρ = 0 and yi = yt .
21 Halton draws can be very effective compared to pseudo-random draws.
For example, Bhat (2001) and Train (2000) report that the simulation vari-
ance in the estimated parameters is lower with 100 Halton draws than with
1,000 pseudo-random draws.
22 The log condition number of the Hessian matrix is, at worst, 1.9, which
means that only two (of a total of sixteen) decimal places of accuracy are
being lost in the calculation of the Hessian, thus suggesting accurate results.
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The NL model assumes σ = 0 and yi = yt and estimates ρ.
The RC model assumes ρ = 0, estimates σ, and allows yi
to follow the empirical distribution of income. Finally, the
RCNL estimates both ρ and σ, and allows yi to follow the
empirical distribution of income.
In the simple logit model both the price parameter (α) and
the mean valuation parameters (β) have the expected signs
and are all significantly different from 0. However, as is well
known, the model is very restrictive since it imposes symmet-
ric cross-price elasticities. Furthermore, demand is inelastic
for almost 20% of the car models across countries and years.
This is inconsistent with oligopolistic profit-maximizing
behavior unless marginal costs would be negative.
In the NL model, the upper nest level consists of the seven
marketing segments, and the lower nest level consists of the
segments and origin (domestic or foreign). The price param-
eter (α) and the mean valuation parameters (β) again have the
expected sign and are significantly different from 0, with the
exception of the parameter for width, which is now insignif-
icant. The nesting parameters are estimated very precisely,
ρ1 = 0.65 and ρ2 = 0.48. Their magnitudes are consis-
tent with the requirements of random utility maximization
(0 ≤ ρ2 ≤ ρ1 < 1) and imply that consumer preferences
show the strongest correlation across cars from both the same
marketing segment and origin (domestic or foreign) and show
weaker but still important correlation across cars from the
same segment but a different origin. This is consistent with
earlier work for a more limited set of countries (Goldberg
& Verboven, 2001; and Brenkers & Verboven, 2006).23 As
documented below, this implies more plausible cross-price
elasticities than the simple logit model. Furthermore, the
implied own-price elasticities are higher than in the simple
logit: demand is now inelastic for only 3% of the car models.
This may seem surprising at first, since the price coefficient
α is closer to 0 than in the simple logit model. However,
the elasticities depend not only on α but also on the nesting
parameters ρ1 and ρ2.
In the RC model, we estimate the price parameter (α)
and the means (β) and standard deviations (σ) for the val-
uations of the other characteristics (including the constant).
The price parameter (α) is again significantly estimated with
the expected sign (negative effect). Consumers have a neg-
ative and significant mean valuation for fuel consumption,
and heterogeneity is limited so that almost all consumers
dislike fuel-inefficient cars. Consumers have a positive and
significant mean valuation for width, and the standard devia-
tion implies that about 10% of consumers dislike large cars.
Consumers have a negative mean valuation for cars of for-
eign origin. The standard deviation is relatively large, so that
25% of consumers actually prefer foreign cars. The mean
valuation for height is insignificantly different from 0, and
23 We also estimated a two-level NL model with the reverse nesting struc-
ture, where origin defines the upper level and origin or segment of the lower
level of the nests. This led to estimates of ρ1 and ρ2 inconsistent with ran-
dom utility maximization, in line with the results of other studies on the car
market.
the mean valuation for horsepower is unexpectedly nega-
tive. However, for both characteristics, we find substantial
and significant heterogeneity: about 50% of consumers have
a positive valuation for height, and about 30% have a positive
valuation for horsepower. Finally, we estimate a significant
standard deviation for the constant, indicating significant
heterogeneity in the valuation of new cars relative to the out-
side good. Overall, the random coefficients show evidence
of significant consumer heterogeneity in several dimensions,
in particular height, horsepower, and foreign origin. Yet it
is striking that the random coefficients are estimated much
less precisely than the two nesting parameters in the NL
model.
In the RCNL model, we combine the previous two mod-
els, so we include both the nesting parameters and the random
coefficients. Both the price parameter (α) and the mean valua-
tion parameters (β) have the expected signs and are estimated
significantly with the exception of the horsepower parameter,
which is insignificant. The most interesting findings relate to
the estimated nesting parameters (ρ) and random coefficients
(σ) in comparison with the NL and RC models.
First, compared with the NL model, the nesting parame-
ters remain highly significant, but their magnitude becomes
smaller. This is consistent with the results from our Monte
Carlo study, where we found an overestimate of the nesting
parameters if the random coefficients are important and the
groups are correlated with the characteristics for the omitted
random coefficients. Furthermore, we can no longer reject
the hypothesis that ρ1 = ρ2 (P-value 0.0967) and the ran-
dom coefficient for foreign origin is insignificant. So the
model reduces to a one-level nested logit with no need to
divide the seven segments into domestic and foreign sub-
groups, and it seems at first that there is no longer consumer
heterogeneity for foreign origin. However, the subsegment
parameter ρ1 captures similar effects as the random coeffi-
cient for foreign origin, suggesting it is not sensible to include
both. Indeed, in a one-level nested logit where we constrain
ρ1 = ρ2 (so that the subgroups are no longer relevant), the
random coefficient for foreign origin becomes significant
again (as in the RC model). We show these results in online
appendix B.24
Second, compared with the RC model, the random coeffi-
cients for horsepower and fuel efficiency remain significant,
but this is no longer the case for width, height, and the
constant. Intuitively, the nesting parameter for the segments
captures a lot of the heterogeneity relating to the car dimen-
sions and the outside good, but not much of the heterogeneity
relating to horsepower and fuel efficiency.
Since the logit, NL, and RC are all restricted versions of the
RCNL model, we can compare their statistical performance
24 In this case, the one-level nested logit with a random coefficient for
foreign origin seems preferable to a two-level nested logit model, since it
does not impose the consumer heterogeneity to enter in a hierarchical way.
Nevertheless, we base our subsequent discussion on the two-level nested
logit. The implied price elasticities and competition policy counterfactuals
are very similar in the one-level nested logit model (not shown).
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Table 7.—Likelihood Ratio Tests for Alternative Demand Models
Logit Nested Logit RC Logit
Logit –
Nested logit 584.08 –
(0.0000)
RC logit 34.08 NA –
(0.0000)
RC nested logit 534.10 30.61 423.84
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
χ2 statistics and P-values (in parentheses) of likelihood ratio tests for different model pairs.
using likelihood ratio tests adapted to the GMM context.25
Table 7 reports LR values and asymptotic P-values for all
pairs of models, except the NL and RC, which are not nested
in each other. Each restricted model is rejected against the
more general models. The logit is clearly rejected against any
other model. More interesting, both the NL and RC models
are rejected against the more general RCNL model. In fact,
the NL appears to provide a better fit than the RC logit relative
to the RCNL, since theχ2 statistic is lower for the NL than the
RC model (30.61 versus 423.84). We already observed that
the individual random coefficients in the RC model are much
less precisely estimated than the two nesting parameters in
the NL model. The likelihood ratio tests thus indicate that
the random coefficients of the RC model are also jointly less
significant than the nesting parameters of the NL model.
Summary. We can summarize our empirical results in
four points:
a. It is important to include the nesting parameter relating
to the seven marketing segments since it remains highly
significant after including the random coefficients.
b. It does not seem appropriate to include an additional
subnesting parameter relating to the origin within
each segment, since the random coefficient for origin
captures this well.
c. It is relevant to include random coefficients for horse-
power and fuel efficiency, but not those for the dimen-
sions width and height since these are captured well by
the marketing segments.
d. It is striking that the nesting parameters (reflecting het-
erogeneity regarding segments and subsegments) are
estimated much more precisely than the random coef-
ficients (reflecting heterogeneity regarding continuous
characteristics).
While these findings apply to our data set of the European
car market, they can be useful as a guide for interpretations
also in other applications.
25 Following Hayashi (2000), we define the likelihood ratio statistic
(LR) as the difference between the value of the objective function of the
restricted model (reestimated using the second-stage weighting matrix of
the unrestricted model) and the value of the objective function of the unre-
stricted model. Under the null hypothesis, the statistic is asymptotically χ2
distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions.
We have done various sensitivity analyses to assess the
robustness of these conclusions. We added a random coeffi-
cient for the continuous characteristic weight, or dropped the
random coefficient for height. In both cases, the magnitude
and significance of the nesting parameter for the segments
are hardly affected.26 We also estimated a model with an
additional upper nest to distinguish the three lower class seg-
ments (subcompact, compact, and standard) from the other
four segments. We did not find this to be an additional source
of segmentation. In sum, this suggests that the segments cap-
ture a separate, unobserved source of market segmentation.
In principle, this may be captured without imposing a nested
logit structure, through random coefficients on the segment
dummies with another distribution (e.g., normal as for the
continuous variables). This would, however, substantially
increase the computational burden.
E. Substitution Patterns
We have already commented on the number of inelas-
tic own-price elasticities implied by our estimates. We now
provide a more systematic discussion on the substitution pat-
terns. We consider own-price and cross-price elasticities at
the level of the individual products and at the level of the
entire segments.
Product-level price elasticities. First, consider the
product-level own- and cross-price elasticities. We average
these by segment and distinguish between cross-price elas-
ticities with respect to other products in the same subsegment,
in a different subsegment within the same segment, and in a
different segment. Table 8 shows these average product-level
elasticities for Germany in 2006 (the largest country in the
most recent year of our data set). In the logit and NL models,
the own-price elasticities tend to increase more or less propor-
tionally with price as one moves to higher segments, resulting
in an average own-price elasticity that is almost four times
higher in the luxury than in the subcompact segment. The near
proportional relationship follows from the functional form
assumption: price enters utility linearly with a homogeneous
valuation across consumers (−α/yt). In contrast, in the RC
and RCNL models, the price elasticities increase much less
than proportionally, by a factor of 2.2 and 2.3 in the respective
models. This follows from the less restrictive functional form:
price still enters utility linearly, but consumer valuations are
heterogeneous (−α/yit). Hence, price-insensitive consumers
are more likely to purchase high-priced cars.
26 Adding random coefficients raises the computational burden of approx-
imating the market share integral and makes it more difficult to identify
the standard deviations of the individual random coefficients. To reduce the
number of random coefficients, we also conducted a principal components
analysis before estimating the model. We find that there are two main prin-
cipal components: the first is closely related to the performance and size
variables; the second is closely related to the sports aspect (acceleration and
height). We estimate a strongly significant random coefficient for the first
principal component and a less significant one for the second component.
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Table 8.—Product-Level Price Elasticities in Germany for
Alternative Demand Models
Cross-Price ElasticityOwn-
Price Same Same Different
Segment Elasticities Subsegment Segment Segment
Logit
Subcompact −0.76 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Compact −1.09 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Intermediate −1.49 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Standard −1.94 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Luxury −2.94 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
SUV −2.32 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Sports −2.73 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Nested logit
Subcompact −1.23 0.02 0.01 <0.01
Compact −1.74 0.03 0.02 <0.01
Intermediate −2.38 0.05 0.03 <0.01
Standard −3.04 0.13 0.05 <0.01
Luxury −4.64 0.17 0.07 <0.01
SUV −3.73 0.05 0.04 <0.01
Sports −4.40 0.08 0.03 <0.01
RC logit
Subcompact −2.85 0.03 <0.01 <0.01
Compact −3.66 0.02 <0.01 0.01
Intermediate −4.38 0.03 <0.01 0.01
Standard −4.96 0.04 0.01 0.01
Luxury −6.24 0.06 0.03 0.01
SUV −5.67 0.04 <0.01 0.01
Sports −6.13 0.02 <0.01 0.02
RC nested logit
Subcompact −2.57 0.03 0.03 <0.01
Compact −3.33 0.05 0.05 <0.01
Intermediate −3.90 0.06 0.06 <0.01
Standard −4.54 0.15 0.09 <0.01
Luxury −5.75 0.17 0.11 <0.01
SUV −5.01 0.07 0.06 <0.01
Sports −5.42 0.10 0.05 <0.01
Product-level own- and cross-price elasticities, based on the parameter estimates in table 6. Elasticities
are averages by segment for Germany in 2006. Cross-price elasticities are averaged across products from
the same subsegment, from a different subsegment within the same segment, and from different segments.
The cross-price elasticities show even more striking differ-
ences across the estimated models. In the logit model, they are
extremely small even with respect to cars from the same sub-
segment or segment (always less than 0.01). In contrast, in the
NL and RCNL models, the cross-price elasticities are quite
high with respect to products of the same subsegment (about
0.1–0.4), and they are still relevant with respect to products of
other subsegments in the same segment (about 0.05). In the
RC model, the cross-elasticities with respect to products of
the same subsegment are still sizable, mainly because of the
magnitude and significance of the foreign ownership random
coefficient. But they are negligible with respect to products
of other segments within the same segment (usually below
0.01). These findings illustrate the importance of accounting
for consumer heterogeneity relating to the marketing seg-
ments (as done only in the NL and RCNL models) and the
domestic or foreign origin (as done in all models except the
simple logit).
Segment-level price elasticities. Now consider the
segment-level price elasticities, that is, the effect of a joint 1%
price increase of all cars in a given segment on demand in the
various segments. Table 9 reports these segment-level own-
and cross-price elasticities. We can summarize these results
as follows. First, as is well known, both the logit and NL mod-
els imply fully symmetric substitution patterns at the segment
level (i.e., identical cross-elasticities per row). For example,
a price increase of all compact cars by 1% raises the demand
in all other segments by 0.02% (more precisely, by 0.017%).
In sharp contrast, the RC model implies more intense sub-
stitution to neighboring segments. Taking the same example,
a price increase of all compact cars by 1% has the highest
effect on the demand for subcompact (+0.76%) and interme-
diate cars (+0.66%) and the lowest effects on the demand for
luxury (0.26%) and SUV cars (+0.39%). Finally, the RCNL
model implies cross-price elasticities somewhere in between
the NL and RC models, though closer to the NL model: the
cross-price elasticities to other segments are fairly (but not
completely) symmetric, and they are somewhat higher than
in the NL model, but not nearly as high as in the RC model.
Although the substitution patterns of the most general
RCNL model appear to be better approximated by the NL
model than by the RC model, this does not necessarily mean
that the NL model should be preferred over the RC model.
The main message is that it is important to account for
consumer heterogeneity regarding the marketing segments.
The NL model is one simple way to capture this, but there
may be alternative ways. For example, one may consider
adding random coefficients for the segments at an increased
computational cost.
Summary. We can summarize the differences in the esti-
mated substitution patterns across models as follows. First,
the own-price elasticities at the product level increase roughly
proportionally with price in the logit and NL models, but
less than proportionally in the RC and RCNL models. This
is because the latter two models allow consumer hetero-
geneity in the price parameter. Second, the product-level
cross-price elasticities show that products of the same seg-
ment are strong substitutes in the NL and RCNL models, but
not in the logit and RC models. Finally, the segment-level
cross-price elasticities show quite strong substitution across
segments (especially the neighboring ones) in the RC model
but only weak (and symmetric) substitution in the logit, NL,
and RCNL models.
IV. Implications for Competition Policy Analysis
Section III showed how the different demand models gen-
erate quite different substitution patterns. But how relevant
are the found differences for applications in industrial organi-
zation or related fields? To address this question, we consider
two areas of competition policy, market definition and merger
simulation, and ask whether the different demand models
yield robust conclusions.
Much of competition policy still heavily relies on mar-
ket definition and an assessment of the firms’ market shares
within the defined market. It is simple and widely applicable
to mergers and horizontal or vertical agreements because it
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Table 9.—Segment-Level Price Elasticities in Germany for Alternative Demand Models
Segment Subcompact Compact Intermediate Standard Luxury SUV Sport
Logit
Subcompact −0.77 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Compact 0.02 −1.12 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Intermediate 0.01 0.01 −1.41 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Standard 0.01 0.01 0.01 −1.75 0.01 0.01 0.01
Luxury 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 −2.59 0.01 0.01
SUV 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 −2.24 0.01
Sports <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 −2.05
Nested logit
Subcompact −0.44 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Compact 0.01 −0.64 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Intermediate <0.01 <0.01 −0.81 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Standard <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 −1.00 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Luxury <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 −1.48 <0.01 0.01
SUV <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 −1.28 <0.01
Sports <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 −1.17
RC logit
Subcompact −1.72 0.67 0.47 0.19 0.07 0.33 0.29
Compact 0.75 −2.77 0.66 0.54 0.26 0.39 0.41
Intermediate 0.29 0.39 −3.47 0.43 0.30 0.45 0.42
Standard 0.12 0.32 0.44 −3.55 0.56 0.43 0.45
Luxury 0.05 0.16 0.32 0.61 −4.05 0.86 0.67
SUV 0.15 0.18 0.37 0.43 0.92 −4.13 0.75
Sports 0.08 0.11 0.20 0.25 0.42 0.49 −4.36
RC nested logit
Subcompact −1.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Compact 0.04 −1.42 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
Intermediate 0.03 0.03 −1.65 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Standard 0.03 0.03 0.04 −1.90 0.05 0.05 0.05
Luxury 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 −2.37 0.08 0.07
SUV 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 −2.12 0.07
Sports 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 −2.03
The segment-level own- and cross-price elasticities (when all products in the same segment raise their price by 1%), based on the parameter estimates in table 6. The elasticities refer to Germany in 2006.
makes few assumptions about oligopoly behavior. However,
the choice of candidate-relevant markets can often be quite
arbitrary and artificial. Furthermore, because it is not based on
a specific model of oligopoly behavior, it cannot make pre-
cise predictions about market power effects or incorporate
other considerations in an integrated framework. In merger
cases, one increasingly resorts to simulation analysis to assess
market power effects and incorporate efficiencies or other
elements (see Werden & Froeb, 1994; Hausman, Leonard, &
Zona, 1994; Nevo, 2000; Peters, 2006). While merger simu-
lation may in principle extend to other types of competition
investigations, this is difficult in practice because it requires
the specification of an appropriate oligopoly model for the
specific competition issue under investigation.
These relative advantages and disadvantages of market def-
inition and merger simulation have been widely discussed.
We will instead look at this from a different angle; we ask
to which extent both approaches are sensitive to the adopted
demand model. If one approach gives more robust conclu-
sions across demand models, this provides a new motivation
to prefer it over the other approach.
A. Market Definition
Market definition in the European car market is relevant not
only for the evaluation of mergers, but also for the implemen-
tation of the block exemption regulation for the selective and
exclusive distribution system. According to this regulation,
automobile manufacturers may impose selective or exclu-
sive distribution to their dealers, provided they have market
shares below 30% or 40%. Some niche manufacturers such
as Mercedes or BMW may meet these thresholds if markets
are defined widely to include all cars, but not if they are
defined narrowly. Hence, it is important to know the size of
the relevant markets.
According to the small but significant and nontransi-
tory increase in price (SSNIP) test, the relevant market is
the smallest group of products for which a hypothetical
monopolist could profitably impose a small, nontransitory
but significant increase in price (typically 5%–10%). Since
the profitability of a price increase depends on the extent of
substitution to other goods, the estimated demand model is
of central importance. For each of the four estimated demand
models, we first compute all products’ implied marginal costs
assuming multiproduct price-setting firms (following BLP,
Nevo, 2000, and others). Given the estimated demand sys-
tems and the marginal costs, we then ask whether a 10%
price increase by all products in a candidate-relevant market
raises profits.
We begin with considering the marketing segments as the
candidate-relevant markets. Table 10A shows the SSNIP test
results for France and Germany in 2006. The logit model
suggests that none of the seven marketing segments can be
considered as separate relevant markets. For example, a joint
NESTED LOGIT OR RANDOM COEFFICIENTS LOGIT? 931
Table 10.—Relevant Market Definition in France and Germany
Logit Nested Logit RC Logit RC Nested Logit
France Germany France Germany France Germany France Germany
A: Candidate Markets Are Segments
Subcompact −0.1 −0.2 5.0 6.7 4.5 4.9 8.8 11.0
Compact −0.6 −0.5 7.2 8.7 −5.1 −1.4 10.8 12.6
Intermediate −1.0 −1.0 7.4 8.4 −8.6 −5.3 10.4 10.4
Standard −1.6 −1.5 13.5 11.1 −7.8 −5.1 16.3 13.3
Luxury −3.4 −3.2 16.2 15.0 −9.5 −5.9 16.6 15.2
SUV −2.4 −2.6 16.5 15.7 2.9 −5.9 18.1 16.0
Sports −1.4 −2.4 10.1 13.9 −11.2 −9.1 12.6 14.2
B: Candidate Markets Are Selected Products’ Ten Closest Substitutes
VW Polo −0.4 −1.0 2.0 3.4 1.4 2.6 3.3 4.0
VW Golf −0.4 −1.0 4.5 6.8 −1.6 2.6 6.0 8.3
VW Passat −0.4 −1.0 4.0 5.1 −1.4 −0.5 4.8 5.5
Audi A4 −0.4 −1.0 10.8 10.1 −3.5 −1.3 12.3 11.7
Audi A6 −0.4 −1.0 11.8 13.5 −3.3 −2.3 10.7 13.1
BMW X3 −0.4 −1.1 5.5 7.7 −4.6 −1.6 2.0 4.3
Mercedes SLK Class −0.4 −1.1 4.0 5.0 −5.2 −2.3 3.4 1.1
Percentage profit increases implied by a joint 10% price increase of all products in the same segment (panel A) and for selected products’ ten closest substitutes (panel B). The results are based on the parameter
estimates in table 6, assuming marginal costs implied by multiproduct Bertrand competition. The effects refer to France and Germany in 2006.
10% price increase in the compact segment in France reduces
profits by 0.6%. The RC model yields a similar conclusion:
only the subcompact segment can be defined as a relevant
market in both France and Germany. In sharp contrast, the
NL and RCNL models result in higher and positive profit
effects, implying that all marketing segments constitute sep-
arate relevant markets. A joint 10% price increase in the
compact segment in France would raise profits by 7.21%
according to the NL model and even by 10.84% according to
the RCNL model. This narrow market definition follows, of
course, from the high significance of the nesting parameter
for the segments in the NL and RCNL models.27
Should we conclude that the RC model fails to define the
markets narrowly at the segment level, in contrast with the
more general RCNL model against which it was rejected?
The answer may seem to be yes, since we found that the
RC model omits important unobservables relating to the
marketing segments that are captured in the more general
RCNL model. However, proper caution is warranted. First,
the RCNL model is itself restrictive since it imposes largely
symmetric substitution across the segments. As an alternative
to the RCNL model, one may also include random coeffi-
cients for segment dummies within an RC framework (at an
increased computational cost, since it requires approximat-
ing a higher dimensional market share integral). Second, even
an RC model without random coefficients on segment dum-
mies may result in a narrower market definition if we do not
restrict attention to segments as candidate-relevant markets,
but instead consider the set of nearest substitutes (which are
more likely to include products from other segments in an
RC model).
27 Market definition may be sensitive to the definition of the potential
market size. Recall that we specified the potential number of consumers Lt
as the number of households. We reestimated the demand models by scaling
Lt up or down by a factor of 2 or 4. The SSNIP test conclusions are robust:
the logit and RC model still predict a wide market definition, while the NL
and RCNL models predict the reverse. To illustrate, we report the SSNIP
test results for Lt/2 in online Appendix B.
To assess this second possibility, we considered candidate-
relevant markets according to the products’ ten closest sub-
stitutes, based on the estimated cross-price elasticities for the
four different demand models. Table 10B implements this
for seven representative products, the top-selling cars in Ger-
many in each segment (e.g., the VW Golf in the compact
segment or the Audi A4 in the standard segment). As may be
expected, for the NL and RCNL, these ten closest substitutes
almost always come from the same segment. In contrast, for
the RC model, they often come from other segments since the
model does not explicitly account for segments as a source of
differentiation.28 Interestingly, despite the fact that we now
include closer substitutes in the RC model, the conclusions
from Table 10B remain similar to those in Table 10A. The
relevant market is not wider than each product’s ten clos-
est substitutes under the NL and RCNL models, while it is
always wider under the logit model. Under the RC model, it
is also usually wider, though there are two exceptions: for the
VW Polo, the relevant market is as narrow as its ten closest
substitutes in both France and Germany; for the VW Golf,
the relevant market is also narrow in Germany, though it is
wider in France. We also computed the minimum number of
closest substitutes to form a separate relevant market for the
four different demand models. In general, we found that the
fewest number of products has to be included for the NL and
RCNL model (about five to ten vehicles), a larger number for
the RC model (about ten to fifteen vehicles), and the largest
for the simple logit model.
In sum, when we use the closest substitutes as a selection
criterion for defining candidate markets, the RC model results
in a narrower market definition than when we use the segment
28 To illustrate, online appendix B reports the ten closest competitors for
the VW Golf for each estimated demand model. In the logit model, the
closest competitors are simply the top-selling cars; in the RC model, they are
cars with similar characteristics, which may come from different segments.
In the NL and RCNL models, the ten closest competitors all come from the
same segment (with one exception).
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Table 11.—Effects of Two Hypothetical Mergers in France and Germany
All Subcompact Compact Intermediate Standard Luxury SUV Sport
PSA-Renault Merger in France
Domestic market shares (%)
PSA 33.4 35.3 38.8 46.0 – 19.1 – 37.3
Renault 22.7 29.8 20.9 17.8 – 9.5 – 13.5
Predicted domestic price increase (%)
Logit 0.9 1.6 0.9 0.75 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.5
Nested logit 15.5 31.2 13.5 12.8 0.0 2.1 0.0 7.0
RC logit 20.2 37.1 22.6 24.1 0.6 4.8 0.1 14.0
RC nested logit 8.3 15.9 8.0 8.2 −0.1 1.5 −0.1 4.5
VW-BMW Merger in Germany
Domestic market shares (%)
BMW 10.6 2.1 7.9 – 39.6 25.3 15.2 10.8
VW 30.8 23.1 36.3 53.8 31.3 32.4 12.0 21.4
Predicted domestic price increase (%)
Logit 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2
Nested logit 2.9 0.6 2.8 0.1 10.0 4.3 1.6 1.1
RC logit 2.2 0.6 2.0 1.8 4.9 3.2 1.7 1.5
2RC nested logit 1.9 0.6 1.8 0.5 5.8 3.0 1.1 0.9
Percentage price increases for two hypothetical mergers, PSA-Renault and BMW-VW, in their domestic markets, France and Germany, based on the parameter estimates in table 6 and assuming multiproduct Bertrand
competition. The effects refer to France and Germany in 2006. Confidence intervals of 95%, based on a bootstrapping procedure, are shown in online appendix B. For example, the 95% confidence interval for the
overall predicted price increase after the PSA-Renault merger is [0.7–1.8]% for the logit, [12.5–18.3]% for the NL, [14.6–27.2]% for the RC, and [5.4–15.7]% for the RCNL model.
criterion, but it is still wider than the market definition in
the NL and RCNL models. This does not mean that the RC
model necessarily leads to a wider market definition than
the NL or RCNL model. It just stresses the importance of
incorporating sufficient sources of heterogeneity in the RC
model, in particular, random coefficients for the segments.
The nesting parameters are one way to achieve this, but within
an RC model, it is also possible to make other distributional
assumptions.
In practical terms, using the closest substitutes to define
markets may become tedious, especially in terms of pre-
senting unambiguous, nonoverlapping market definitions in
competition cases. As a simpler alternative, one may define
two neighboring segments as the relevant market in the RC
model (as suggested by the cross-price elasticities). Our
SSNIP test results at the level of neighboring segments (not
shown) demonstrate that two neighboring segments still do
not form relevant markets in the logit model, but they do form
relevant markets in the RC model: a joint 10% price increase
would raise profits for compact + intermediate (+1.6%), for
example, but not for compact + luxury (–1.2%).
B. Merger Simulation
We consider the effects of two hypothetical mergers.
The first merger is between the two French manufacturers
PSA (Peugeot and Citroën) and Renault, and the second
merger is between the two German manufacturers BMW and
Volkswagen (Volkswagen, Audi, Seat, and Skoda). As shown
in table 11, PSA and Renault are strong in their home market,
France, with a combined market share of 56% (mainly due to
the mass segments). BMW and Volkswagen are slightly less
strong in their home market, Germany, with a combined mar-
ket share of 41%. But they have a particularly strong presence
in the standard segment (71%) and the luxury segment (58%).
We first compute the products’ marginal costs assuming
multiproduct price-setting firms, as we also did to implement
market definition. Given the estimated demand systems and
the marginal costs, we then predict the new Nash equilib-
rium resulting from the changed ownership structure after
the merger. Intuitively, a merger will entail high price effects
if the merging firms sell close substitutes with respect to each
other (low cross-price elasticities) and weak substitutes with
respect to outsider firms (low own-price elasticities).
Table 11 shows the predicted price effects of the two merg-
ers in the firms’ home markets. We also briefly comment on
the effects in the foreign markets and show these results in
online appendix B. We show the percentage price increases
for both the entire market and each of the seven market-
ing segments (using price indices, where postmerger market
shares are the weights).
For both mergers, the logit model predicts very small
domestic price effects, despite the merging firms’ strong
domestic market presence. In sharp contrast, the NL, RC,
and RCNL models give more robust conclusions. The
PSA-Renault merger would result in large aggregate price
increases in France (between 8.3% and 20.2%). The over-
all predicted price increases are closeest for the NL and
RC models (15.5% and 20.1%). They are somewhat lower
for the RCNL model (20.2%), but the confidence intervals
still overlap (as shown in online appendix B). The BMW-
VW merger entails more modest price increases in its home
country, Germany, but the results are again robust across all
models except the logit model (between 1.9% and 3.0%).
In particular, the predicted price increases are the largest in
the standard segment, where the German producers have the
strongest presence (between 4.9% and 10.0%). While the NL,
RC, and RCNL all give fairly robust conclusions regarding
the predicted merger effects, the NL model gives more pre-
cise predictions than the RC model (as shown by the smaller
confidence intervals in online appendix B). The predictions
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from the RC model consequently also show more sensitivity
under alternative specifications.29
The predicted price effects in the foreign markets are much
smaller (shown in online appendix B). But there is again
a notable difference between the logit model and the other
three models (where the predicted effects are between 0.4%
and 0.6% for the BMW-VW merger in France and between
0.2% and 0.4% for the PSA-Renault merger in Germany).
In sum, from a practical perspective, these findings show
that it is clearly inappropriate to use a simple logit model
with its symmetric substitution patterns. The merger pre-
dictions from the NL, RC, or RCNL model are broadly
consistent, although the confidence intervals are higher in the
RC model (so that they are also more sensitive to variations
in the specification).
C. Summary
We can summarize our findings on market definition and
merger simulation as follows. Merger simulation yields fairly
clear conclusions across different demand models: the simple
logit model is clearly inappropriate, but a generalization to
the NL, RC, or RCNL gives fairly robust conclusions (though
less precise for the RC model). In contrast, market defini-
tion depends more heavily on the adopted demand model. In
particular, the RC model suggests a wider market definition
than the NL and RCNL models, which directly incorporate
the segments as a segmentation source.
V. Conclusion
We started from an aggregate RCNL model to provide
a systematic comparison between the simple logit and NL
models and the computationally more complex RC model.
We first used simulated data to document parameter biases
from estimating an NL or RC model. We then use data on
the automobile market to estimate the different models and,
as an illustration, to assess what they imply for competition
policy analysis. Our main findings on the advantages and dis-
advantages of the NL and RC models can be summarized as
follows.
In terms of statistical performance, both the NL and the
RC models are rejected against the RCNL model. The NL
model appears to be less strongly rejected (much lower χ2)
than the RC model, and the nesting parameters of the NL
model (ρ) drop by only a modest amount after including ran-
dom coefficients on continuous variables (σ) in the RCNL
model. Furthermore, the nesting parameters are estimated
more precisely than the random coefficients. This shows
that the marketing segments capture an important, separate
source of unobserved consumer heterogeneity. In principle,
this could be captured with random coefficients in the RC
29 We dropped the random coefficient for height and added one for weight
as alternative specifications. This results in lower predicted price effects
in the RC model, but the patterns across the different segments remain
comparable (see online appendix B).
model, but this would come at an increased computational
burden.
In terms of substitution patterns, the NL and RC mod-
els yield quite different results. The own-price elasticities
increase nearly proportionally with price in the NL model and
less than proportionally in the RC model, because the latter
model allows for consumer heterogeneity in the price parame-
ter. Furthermore, products within the same segment are much
closer substitutes in the NL model, whereas there is strong
substitution to other segments (especially to neighboring
ones) in the RC model.
Despite the rather different substitution patterns, the NL
and RC models generate quite robust conclusions on the
predicted price effects from mergers. In sharp contrast, the
conclusions for market definition are not robust: markets are
defined more narrowly in the NL and RCNL models than in
the RC or logit models. This suggests two implications for
competition policy. First, in market definition, it is important
to directly account for the segment dummies as direct sources
of market segmentation. Second, in merger simulation, the
conclusions are more robust across demand models, sug-
gesting that the simple NL model can be sufficient to obtain
reliable policy conclusions despite the different substitution
patterns.
More generally, one can draw two implications for the
choice of demand model in applied work. First, the choice
between the tractable NL model and the computationally
more complex RC model may depend on the application.
In our merger analysis, we considered two domestic merg-
ers. In this case, a particularly relevant aspect of consumer
heterogeneity is the cars’ domestic or foreign origin, which
the NL model captures reasonably well. In other applica-
tions, the most relevant aspects of consumer heterogeneity
may not be captured well by nesting parameters for groups
or subgroups. In these cases, it is appropriate to estimate
RC models with random coefficients for the most relevant
continuous characteristics.
Second, our findings show that it is important to account for
sources of market segmentation that are not captured by the
continuously measured characteristics in the RC model. We
established this by adding a nested logit structure to BLP’s
random coefficients model (which is computationally simpler
than adding random coefficients for the segment dummies
with other distributions). In future research, one may also
consider other tractable models from the GEV family to
capture additional sources of heterogeneity.
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APPENDIX
Contraction Mapping for Nested Logit Model
In this appendix we show how to modify BLP’s contraction mapping to
solve the demand system s = s(δ) in the random coefficients nested logit
model, with a nesting parameter ρ. To simplify the exposition, we consider
a nested logit without random coefficients, so σ = 0. Note that in this
case, there is an analytic solution for s = s(δ) (Berry (1994), so a contrac-
tion mapping is not actually needed. The analysis here straightforwardly
generalizes to the case where σ = 0.
BLP’s Original Contraction Mapping
BLP showed that the function f (δ), defined pointwise by
fj(δ) ≡ δj + ln(sj) − ln(sj(δ)),
is a contraction mapping with modulus less than 1 when the demand system
s = s(δ) is given by the (random coefficients) logit model, where the nesting
parameter ρ = 0. To satisfy the conditions of their theorem, it is required
that fj is differentiable and satisfies the following monotonicity conditions:
∂fj
∂δj
= 1 − 1
sj
∂sj
∂δj
≥ 0,
∂fj(δ)
∂δk
= − 1
sj
∂sj
∂δk
≥ 0, k = j, (A1)
J∑
k=1
∂fj
∂δk
− 1 = 1
sj
J∑
k=1
∂sj
∂δk
<0.
To assess whether these conditions are satisfied for the nested logit model,
note first that the demand derivatives are given by
∂sj
∂δj
=
(
1
1 − ρ −
ρ
1 − ρ sj|g − sj
)
sj ,
∂sj
∂δk
=
(
− ρ
1 − ρ sk|g − sk
)
sj for j, k in the same group g,
∂sj
∂δk
= −sksj for j, k in a different group g.
Substituting these derivatives in equation (A1) and rearranging shows that
∂fj
∂δj
≥ 0 ⇔ ρ ≤ sj
1 − sj|g + sj ,
∂fj
∂δk
≥ 0 ⇔
ρ
1−ρ sk|g + sk ≥ 0 for j, k in the same group g
sk ≥ 0 for j, k in a different group g ,
J∑
k=1
∂fj
∂δk
− 1<0 ⇔ s0 > 0,
where s0 = 1 − ∑Jk=1 sk is the market share of the outside good. The
second and third inequality are satisfied. However, the first inequality is
satisfied only for ρ sufficiently close to 0, so that BLP’s function f (δ) is not
necessarily a contraction mapping for the nested logit model.
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Modified Contraction Mapping
Consider the following modification of BLP’s original function f (δ),
fj(δ) ≡ δj + ln(sj) − (1 − ρ) ln(sj(δ)),
which dampens the original function by (1 − ρ).
The monotonicity conditions of BLP’s theorem become
∂fj
∂δj
= 1 − (1 − ρ) 1
sj
∂sj
∂δj
≥ 0,
∂fj(δ)
∂δk
= −(1 − ρ) 1
sj
∂sj
∂δk
≥ 0, k = j,
J∑
k=1
∂fj
∂δk
− 1 = (1 − ρ) 1
sj
J∑
k=1
∂sj
∂δk
<0.
The second and third conditions remain satisfied as in the orginal contraction
mapping for 0 ≤ ρ < 1. To verify the first condition, substitute the above
derivative for ∂sj/∂δj to obtain
∂fj
∂δj
= 1 − (1 − ρ)
(
1
1 − ρ −
ρ
1 − ρ sj|g − sj
)
= ρsj|g + (1 − ρ)sj ≥ 0,
for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Hence, the modified function satisfies BLP’s mono-
tonicity conditions, and we use this as a contraction mapping to solve
the (random coefficients) nested logit demand system. Note that the
dampening for the contraction mapping implies a larger value for the
Lipschitz constant and thus a slower rate of convergence, especially as ρ
approaches 1.
